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1 Introduction 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions play a major role in the ongoing 
globalisation process and are often the subject of public debate on the pros and 
cons of increased economic integration. One of the areas of influence of foreign 
acquisitions is the labour market. In the public debate foreign acquisitions are 
often seen as increasing job insecurity due to the perceived ease with which 
multinational companies can shift their production facilities elsewhere following 
adverse changes in their operating environment. On the other hand, policy in 
many countries is designed to attract foreign direct investment because of its 
perceived positive influence on the host country’s economy.   
 
Empirical research on the effects of foreign acquisitions has mainly focused on 
productivity and wages. There have, nevertheless, also been a number of 
contributions to the analysis of the impact that transition to foreign ownership has 
on employment. However, the existing evidence is predominantly based on plant 
and firm level data, which implies that the employment effects found in these 
studies may mask a number of interesting individual level developments taking 
place following a foreign acquisition. For example, foreign acquisitions may 
affect different types of workers in different ways depending on the motives of the 
acquisition. By following the employees of firms subject to a foreign acquisition 
and combining this with information on individual characteristics, we can study 
whether some employee groups are e.g. more adversely affected by foreign 
acquisitions than others. Taking into account the subsequent employment status of 
employees that leave a firm following a foreign acquisition can also give us an 
idea of how severe the effects of potential workforce restructuring are at the 
individual level.  
 
In addition to being predominantly at the firm and plant level, previous empirical 
research has been mostly based on data from the manufacturing sector, which is a 
limitation, considering the increased importance of the service sector. There may 
be important differences between the motives and impacts of acquisitions in 
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different sectors. For example, to the extent that certain service sector firms may 
need a customer interface, it may not be as straightforward for an acquirer to 
restructure the workforce of a service sector firm as it would be in an industrial 
firm. 
 
When studying the impact of foreign acquisitions on personnel it is also important 
to try to distinguish between effects that potentially are common to any 
acquisition, be it cross-border or not, and effects that are unique to transactions 
where the acquirer is foreign. An acquisition per se may induce restructuring, but 
to the extent that the motives of foreign and domestic acquisitions differ, there 
may be quite different implications for the workforce. For example, there is 
survey evidence from Finland indicating that the most prevalent reasons for 
acquisitions of Finnish companies by foreign companies have to do with access to 
the Finnish, Nordic or Russian market (Ali-Yrkkö et al. 2004). There are also 
differences depending on sector, with technological know-how also being a 
commonly cited motive for foreign acquisitions in some industrial sectors. 
Motives for purely domestic mergers may differ from these, which may imply 
different consequences for employees.  
 
This paper seeks to complement earlier studies on the links between foreign 
acquisitions and the workforce, and contributes to the literature in two ways: 
firstly, the analysis focuses on the effects of foreign acquisitions for employment 
outcomes at the individual level, and secondly, all sectors of the economy are 
covered. We use linked employer-employee data on a representative sample of 
Finnish employees in all sectors, which enables us to analyze the flow of workers 
in plants following a foreign acquisition. We decompose these flows by 
destination states and control for individual and firm characteristics in studying 
the effect that foreign acquisition has on the probability of ending up in a 
particular state. We also seek to establish whether the effects of acquisitions are 
similar regardless of whether foreign companies are involved, i.e. we distinguish 
between the effects of purely domestic mergers and cross border acquisitions. 
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The analysis shows that in the industrial sector, the job separation hazard 
increases in the year following a foreign or domestic acquisition. In the case of 
foreign acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-employment become more 
likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing more than the probability 
of moving to non-employment. However, in certain industrial sectors, where 
technological know-how may be argued to be important, the job separation hazard 
does not increase following foreign acquisitions. There is no such difference 
between different types of industrial sectors following domestic mergers. This 
may indicate knowledge sourcing as a motive behind foreign acquisitions in these 
sectors. M&A transactions do not appear to influence the job separation hazard of 
service sector employees in the first year following the acquisition, but in the 
second and third years after the transaction the job separation hazard increases 
with a larger change following foreign than domestic acquisitions. The finding 
may be related to the need for a customer interface which restricts the possibilities 
for immediate restructuring. In the industrial sector the job separation hazard 
decreases in the second and third years following both foreign and domestic 
acquisitions, implying a one-off restructuring. The impact of a foreign acquisition 
does not vary by individual characteristics in either sector, whereas following a 
domestic merger there is an increase in the job separation hazard of university 
educated employees. Also older workers experience an increase in their job 
separation hazard following a domestic merger.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
overview of the related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the 
data used in the analysis. Section 4 describes transitions of workers and presents 
the analysis of the effect of foreign acquisition on individual employment 
outcomes. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
2 Related literature 
2.1 Theoretical background 
 
The analysis of the effects of foreign acquisitions links two distinct strands of 
literature: theories of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and theories of mergers 
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and acquisitions (M&A). Theories of MNEs have implications for employment 
through different routes. Firstly, they imply that the skill structure of the labour 
force in MNEs may differ from that of purely domestic firms, with MNEs having 
a higher share of skilled employees (Markusen, 2002). This may lead to 
restructuring when a firm develops into a MNE. Secondly, MNEs may differ from 
purely domestic firms in terms of the speed and magnitude of employment 
adjustment due to their ability to relocate production on the one hand and the 
different skill structure of their labour force on the other (Barba Navaretti et al., 
2003). The higher share of skilled workers implies more rigid labour demand1 but 
the ability to relocate implies a speedier and potentially larger adjustment.  
 
Both of the effects mentioned above arise from the differences between MNEs 
(both domestically or foreign owned) and purely domestic firms. The literature on 
mergers and acquisitions, on the other hand, considers the effects of the actual 
change of ownership as a one off event. This literature has discussed several 
different frameworks for thinking about the employment effects of foreign 
acquisitions. These models link ownership change to e.g. creative destruction, 
market competition, scale economies and synergies2. The hypotheses on the 
effects of ownership change on employment derived from these models vary and 
are related to the different motives behind the transactions. For instance, 
exploiting synergies may lead to higher employment if the rise in efficiency 
enables an expansion in market share. On the other hand, disposing of overlapping 
functions to improve efficiency may lead to downsizing. An acquisition may also 
have different effects on different types of employees. Eg. if an acquisition is 
undertaken with the intention of changing management practices, this will most 
likely affect management differently than the rest of the workforce (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). To the extent that acquisitions in foreign and domestic markets 
may be undertaken for different reasons and may involve e.g. different degrees of 
overlapping functions between the firms involved in the transaction, the 
implications for employees may be quite different following a foreign rather than 
domestic acquisition.  
                                                
1 Hamermesh (1993). 
2 E.g. Jensen (1988), Bradley et al. (1983), Salant et al. (1985), Schleifer and Summers (1987). 
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When considering individual employment outcomes following foreign 
acquisitions, it is also worthwhile to consider the implications of the literature on 
MNEs and the literature on M&As in the context of workers flows. In models 
such as Jovanovic (1979), the job-matching process ensures that workers are 
optimally assigned to jobs. In such a framework acquisitions may be thought of as 
causing turnover, if they change the value of a worker-employer match. This may 
again depend on distinct characteristics of foreign vs. domestic acquisitions.  
 
With increasingly integrated international markets it may be argued that some 
acquisitions by foreign firms may bear characteristics related more to pure 
acquisition effects than the multinational aspects of the transaction.   All in all, the 
predictions in terms of employment effects of foreign acquisitions are not clear 
cut and empirical evidence must be consulted for clarification. 
 
2.2 Previous empirical research 
 
Empirical research on the employment effects of foreign acquisitions is still quite 
scarce and, as mentioned above, conducted on plant and firm level data. Studies 
that consider foreign acquisitions explicitly include Girma and Görg (2004) for 
the UK, Piscitello and Rabbiosi (2005) for Italy, Balsvik and Haller (2007) for 
Norway,  Bellak et al. (2006) for Austria, Bandick and Karpaty (2007) for 
Sweden, and Böckerman and Lehto (2008) for Finland. The results from these 
studies are mixed. In the context of the current analysis, the most relevant is 
probably the previous on Finnish data by Böckerman and Lehto (2008) who find 
that acquisitions by foreign based firms have a negative effect on employment 
only in the manufacturing sector whereas takeovers by foreign-owned companies 
based in Finland have a substantially negative impact on employment in a group 
containing firms in construction and services. They also study domestic 
acquisitions and find that these have a negative effect on employment in all 
sectors. 
 
 5 
Studies that do not take into account the nationality of the acquiring firm have 
been conducted using both US and European data, but again almost exclusively 
with plant and firm level data. Research on US data has found both negative and 
positive effects of employment3, whereas European evidence implies mainly 
negative effects of M&A on employment4. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) compare 
the effects of M&A in the US and Europe using firm level data and find that in 
Europe mergers significantly reduce the demand for labour but in the US there is 
no evidence of significantly adverse effects. They also take into account cross 
border mergers and acquisitions but do not find significant differences compared 
to domestic acquisitions.  
 
Individual level employment effects of M&A have previously been studied by 
Margolis (2006) using French data. He distinguishes between the effects on the 
acquiring and acquired firm and finds that employees of the acquired firm are less 
likely to remain with the new entity immediately after the takeover.  He also 
observes that the workers with characteristics typically associated with the fastest 
subsequent job finding are overrepresented among those leaving a firm following 
a takeover. Gibbs et al. (2007) study post-merger organizational integration using 
individual level data from Denmark and find that if employees of the acquiring 
firm are dominant in the new firm, as measured by number of employees in the 
two groups, they experience lower turnover. Siegel and Simons. (2008) study 
individual level employment effects of M&A using Swedish manufacturing data. 
They find that M&As significantly increase the likelihood of inter-firm mobility 
and unemployment. These studies do not, however, distinguish between foreign 
and domestic M&A.  
 
Individual level employment effects of foreign acquisitions are also related to the 
changes in the skill composition of employment. This issue has been studied using 
plant level data by Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) for Indonesia, Almeida (2003) for 
                                                
3 See Brown and Medoff (1988), Bhagat et al. (1990), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), McGuckin 
et al. (1995) and McGuckin and Nguyen (2000). 
 
4 See Conyon et al. (2002), Siegel and Simons (2006). 
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Portugal and Huttunen (2007) for Finland. The results from these studies differ 
from one another, and in the context of the current analysis it is interesting to note 
that using Finnish manufacturing data, Huttunen (2007) finds that the share of 
highly educated workers decreases following a few years after a foreign 
acquisition. Considering the implications of the theory of MNEs this finding is 
slightly surprising, and provides a useful comparison for the current individual 
level analysis.  
 
The previous literature discussed above gives rise to interesting issues that can be 
studied with the individual level data at hand. The theory on M&A does not 
provide clear predictions regarding the employment effects of foreign 
acquisitions. However, previous empirical findings give us reason to expect that 
the probability of a job separation will go up following a foreign acquisition and 
that there may be different effects for different types of employees. In addition, 
analysis of the destinations of workers who leave a firm following a foreign 
acquisition should shed some light on the severity of employment changes at the 
individual level. 
3 Data 
 
This study is based on a data set from Statistics Finland that links information on 
employers, i.e. firms and plants, and their employees. The data set is a 1/3 sample 
of individuals that were 16 to 69 years old in 1990. They are followed to year 
2002 and the sample is extended each year by adding a 1/3 sample of 16 year old 
persons. The data set is formed by linking data from various Statistics Finland 
databases: Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data, Business Register, 
Industrial Statistics and Financial Statements Statistics. Information on the 
employer is linked to each individual based on the employer at the end of the year. 
Because of confidentiality, some of the firm level information is in the form of 
classified variables (firm size), ratios (value added per employee), growth rates 
(change in firm level employment), or binary variables (foreign ownership). These 
data are collected for all available years on all firms and plants that employ at 
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least one individual in the sample. The plant and firm panels thus cover most of 
the business sector in Finland5.  
 
Information on foreign ownership is available from 1994 onwards, which is not a 
severe restriction considering that foreign ownership in Finland was scarce before 
this time due to strict regulations that were not abolished until 1992 (Golub, 
2003). Foreign acquisitions can first be identified in 1995, so when analyzing the 
effects of foreign acquisition on subsequent employment status the analysis years 
are 1996 to 2002. Job spells for employees with a plant code are studied, which 
basically concentrates the analysis on the business sector. The data set consists of 
508 788 individuals who work in 114 996 plants giving a total of 1 871 277 
person year observations.  
 
Foreign ownership is defined on the basis of ultimate beneficiary owner (UBO) 
and a 20 % threshold is used in classifying a plant as foreign owned. Foreign 
acquisitions and foreign divestitures are identified on the basis of the ultimate 
beneficiary owner changing from domestic to foreign and vice versa. Many 
differences between foreign owned and domestic firms, such as the ability to shift 
production from one country to another, relate more to the multinationality of the 
firm than the actual nationality of ownership, and therefore it may be relevant to 
control for multinational status of the firm. We can identify domestic and foreign 
MNEs during the last years of our observation period, and use this information in 
robustness checks.  
 
Identifying purely domestic mergers and acquisitions is slightly more difficult 
than identifying foreign acquisitions due to the nature of the data set. Plant codes 
are very stable and remain the same regardless of the ownership of the plant. Firm 
codes, however, may change due to other reasons than acquisitions (e.g. change of 
legal status of the firm). However, there are cases in which changes in firm codes 
                                                
 
5 The linking of the data set is described in detail in Ilmakunnas et al (2001). 
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can reasonably unambiguously be identified as mergers6. These types of changes 
are:  
 
• The firm codes of two or more plants change to the same new firm code. 
Usually the old firm codes of these plants disappear, although it is possible 
that some part of one or both of the old firms remains outside the new 
entity. 
• The firm code of one or more existing plants changes to an existing firm 
code previously related to one or more other plants. I.e. plants join another 
firm and their old firm code usually disappears.  
 
This method is not completely flawless but should enable us to control for 
domestic mergers and acquisitions to a reasonable extent. As our primary focus is 
on the effects of foreign acquisitions, it is important to be able to control for 
effects of acquisitions in general, which this method can be argued to accomplish.  
Table 1 shows the number of firms and employees involved in different types of 
ownership during our observation period. The number of firms involved in foreign 
acquisitions is quite high compared to domestic mergers, as the definition of 
foreign acquisitions is broader. The number of foreign divestitures and employees 
involved in them is low, which should be kept in mind when analyzing the results. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
In this study we analyze transitions out of private sector plants and distinguish 
between transitions based on destination state. The different destination states 
considered are unemployment, outside the labour force, employed without a plant 
code, and employed with a new employer with a plant code. Employers without 
plant codes consist of e.g. most of the public sector whereas employers with plant 
codes cover effectively the whole business sector. Changing to a new employer is 
defined as a simultaneous change in a worker’s plant code and the start of a new 
employment contract. In addition, if an employee’s firm code does not change, 
                                                
6 I wish to thank Valerie Smeets for suggesting this method of identifying mergers. 
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then he/she is classified as staying with the same employer, i.e. changing plants 
within the same firm is generally not regarded as a job change.   
 
The analysis includes a wide range of conditioning variables that previous studies 
have found to have an impact on employment transitions7. We include controls 
both at the individual and firm/plant level. The individual level variables include 
socioeconomic characteristics such as age, education, gender, marital status and 
under aged children. The job specific control variables we use are measured in the 
year prior to the year in which labour market status is evaluated. Tenure is 
included in order to control for duration dependence8. In addition, the log of 
taxable earnings is included as this may control for individual heterogeneity. 
Firms may also use the wage to lower quit rates.  
 
The firm and plant level control variables include firm size, value added per 
worker, industry dummies as well as an indicator for declining employment in the 
year prior to the year in which we determine whether a plant has been acquired. 
This is done in order to account for reductions in employment that can not be 
attributed to the change of ownership. In addition we control for exporter and 
importer status of the firm so as to not confuse effects of this type of 
internationalization with the influence of a foreign acquisition.  
 
The ownership variables included in the analysis are used to distinguish between 
the impact of different types of acquisitions. We include separate indicators for 
whether the employer was involved in a domestic M&A transaction, was subject 
to a foreign acquisition or was divested by a foreign firm in the previous period. 
As discussed above, if there are differences in the motives for foreign and 
domestic acquisitions, the consequences for the workforce may be quite different. 
We also include indicators for whether one’s employer is in foreign ownership at 
some stage in the observation period or is involved in either a foreign or purely 
                                                
7 See e.g. Blau and Kahn (1981), Light and Ureta (1992), Lynch (1992), Royalty (1998), Anderson 
and Meyer (1994).  
8 The data are left censored, i.e. also job spells that begin before our observation period are 
included. The start date of each spell and thus tenure is, however, known also for those spells that 
begin prior to our observation period.  
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domestic M&A transaction at some point in the observation period. This enables 
us to control for persistent differences between these groups of firms.  
 
In order to determine whether the consequences of M&A transactions differ for 
different types of employees, we interact the indicators for ownership change with 
individual education and age. We also include interactions of sector with the 
ownership change variables to take into account potential differences in the 
service sector as opposed to the industrial sector as found by Böckerman and 
Lehto (2008). As motives for acquisition may differ depending also on more 
detailed industry characteristics, we also conduct robustness checks with more 
detailed industry splits. Descriptive statistics of the control variables are displayed 
in Table 2 and Table 3, and a sectoral breakdown of employees affected by M&A 
transactions is presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 2, Table 3, Table 4] 
4 Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we first analyze the changes in the probability of separating from a 
job following foreign and domestic acquisitions. After this we disaggregate the 
job separations based on destination states in order to study the employment 
outcomes of workers involved in M&A transactions. Finally we conduct 
robustness checks on the chosen specifications.   
4.1 Job separations following foreign acquisitions 
 
To analyze job separations following foreign acquisitions we estimate a duration 
model in order to take into the differences in time in which workers are at risk of 
separating from their job. As we are using annual data, i.e. the data is grouped into 
intervals, we use a discrete time version of a proportional hazards model, the 
complementary log-log model. In this model the discrete time hazard of 
separating from a job can be expressed as: 
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where x is a 1 x K vector of characteristic of the individual, βj is K x 1, γ 
characterizes duration dependence and t refers to the time period. As we are 
dealing with discrete time, this hazard is the probability of having spell length t, 
conditional on survival up to time t.9  We estimate the complementary log-log 
model assuming normally distributed unobserved heterogeneity at the plant level. 
It should be noted that acquisitions may be correlated with unobservable 
individual characteristics and due care needs to be taken when interpreting the 
results. However, the problem may be less severe than in similar plant-level 
studies. Using indicators for whether a firm is involved in a domestic or foreign 
M&A transaction at some stage during our observation period should control for 
persistent differences between firms that are targeted by acquirers and others, and 
plant level controls such as value added per worker may otherwise alleviate the 
problem. But interpreting the findings as strictly causal effects should be avoided.   
 
Table 5 presents the results of estimation of different specifications of the 
complementary log-log model. Results are presented in the form of hazard ratios, 
with numbers greater than one indicating that the covariate has a positive 
proportional impact on the hazard and numbers less than one implying a negative 
proportional impact on the hazard. Column 1 of Table 5 shows results from a 
complementary log-log model where we take into account whether the firm was 
involved in an M&A transaction in the previous period and interact this with 
indicator for the firm being in the industrial sector (as opposed to services)10. The 
upper part of Table 5 shows the effects of the individual and firm/plant level 
control variables we include in the analysis. We will briefly discuss these first.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
                                                
9 See e.g. Jenkins (2005). 
10 The industrial sector is defined as manufacturing, utilities, construction and mining and 
quarrying. 
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The effects of the control variables in column 1 are mostly as expected based on 
previous research. Females with young children are more likely to leave the firm, 
most likely reflecting transitions out of the labour force. This can be determined in 
more detail in the next section where flows are decomposed based on destination 
state. Employees with more tenure are slightly less likely to leave the firm which 
implies positive duration dependence. As discussed above, we include income to 
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity and the results show that 
individuals with higher earnings are less likely to separate from their job. This is 
consistent with search theory and findings in other empirical studies. Since 
earnings are potentially endogenous, we also ran the estimations without this 
variable, and our main results are robust to this change. 
 
The plant and firm level control variables in column 1 also have expected impacts. 
To control for reductions in employment that are not related to ownership change, 
we include an indicator for declining employment at the plant between years t-2 
and t-1. Unsurprisingly, previous downsizing increases the hazard of job 
separation. Higher labour productivity as measured by value added per worker 
decreases the job separation hazard. Firm size also has a significant effect on the 
job separation hazard, with employees in larger firms less likely to leave their job. 
This most likely reflects a broader range of employment possibilities within the 
firm and can be examined more closely using disaggregated flows in the next 
section.  
 
To control for persistent differences between firms that are involved in foreign or 
domestic acquisitions and those that are not, we also include indicators for 
whether the firm in question is part of an M&A deal, be it foreign or domestic, at 
some point during our observation period and also an indicator for being foreign 
owned at some stage. These indicators therefore take the same value for a given 
firm during the whole observation period. We can see in column 1 in the first part 
of Table 5 that when the hazard of job separation is higher in firms that at some 
point are foreign owned. By contrast, firms targeted by acquirers, be they foreign 
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or domestic, do not appear persistently different from other firms in terms of job 
separation probabilities.  
 
The primary variables of interest are those related to ownership change in the 
second part of Table 5. As discussed above, in the specification in column 1 we 
interact the indicators of ownership change with an indicator for the firm being in 
the industrial sector. The ownership variables without the interaction term 
therefore give the estimates for the service sector. In the service sector the job 
separation hazard actually decreases by following a purely domestic merger and a 
foreign divestiture, and there is no significant change after a foreign acquisition. 
With respect to foreign divestitures, it should be noted that the number of firms 
and employees involved in these transactions is very limited, as seen in Table 1, 
so the economic significance of the results concerning them is not substantial. We 
will therefore not concentrate on the impact of foreign divestitures in our analysis 
of the results. 
 
By contrast, in the industrial sector the hazard of job separation increases 
following both domestic mergers and foreign acquisitions. For employees in 
industrial firms that are involved in a domestic merger, the hazard of exiting the 
job rises by approximately 12%11  and for employees in firms subject to a foreign 
acquisition the increase is as high as 24%. In the industrial sector there does, 
therefore, appear to be restructuring taking place after both domestic and foreign 
M&A deals. The difference between the change in the job separation hazard 
following M&A transactions in services and the industrial sector may be related to 
e.g. requirements of a customer interface in certain service sector firms. In such 
cases, restructuring the workforce within a short time horizon may not be 
possible.    
 
                                                
11 The overall estimated impact of a domestic merger on the job separation hazard in the industrial 
sector is given by the hazard ratio for the indicator of a domestic merger (i.e. the impact in the 
service sector)  multiplied by the hazard ratio of the interaction term of the domestic merger and 
the industrial sector dummy.  
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Since the potential impact of ownership change may take some time to materialize 
as implied by Huttunen’s (2007) study, we also consider the effects of M&A deals 
two and three years after the transaction. The specification is otherwise similar to 
that in column 1 of Table 5. It should be noted, that as all individuals included in 
the estimation need to be observed for at least four periods, the number of 
observations available for estimation drops and the structure of the estimation 
sample also changes. The results are shown in column 2 of Table 5.  
 
The results show that in the service sector there is a significant increase in the job 
separation hazard in the second and third years following both a purely domestic 
merger and a foreign acquisition. Employees in firms subject to a domestic 
merger experience a 10% increase in the job separation hazard in both the second 
and third years after the transaction. Workers in the service sector whose 
employer was subject to a foreign acquisition two to three years earlier have a job 
separation hazard that is 25% to 30% higher than the hazard for employees in 
firms not involved in such a transaction. As discussed above, the finding that there 
is no change in the service sector job separation hazard in the first year after an 
M&A transaction but an increase is observed in the following years may be 
related to the structure of some service businesses requiring a continuing customer 
interface.  
 
In the industrial sector, on the other hand, following the first year increase in the 
job separation hazard that was found above to be related to both domestic and 
foreign acquisitions, there is actually a decrease in the job separation hazard in the 
second and third years following both domestic and foreign acquisitions. Taking 
into account the total change, i.e. the combination of the impact on the reference 
group of service sector employees and the interaction term, indicates that the 
decreases in the job separation hazard in the industrial sector are 3% and 6% in 
the second year after domestic and foreign acquisitions respectively and 15% and 
10% in the third year. In this specification, the first year increase in the hazard 
appears slightly stronger following domestic mergers.  These results indicate that 
in the industrial sector there is restructuring taking place in the first year following 
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the transaction, but following these initial changes, the job separation hazard of 
remaining employees actually decreases compared to their colleagues in other 
firms.  
 
As we are using individual level data we are also able to examine the impact that 
different types of M&A have on particular groups of employees. The results in 
column 3 of show estimation of the same specification as in column 1, but with 
the ownership change variables additionally interacted with the education and age 
of the individual. As should be expected, the impacts of the individual level 
control variables in the first part of Table 5 are the same for the extended 
specification in column 3 as for the estimation shown in column 1.  
 
Turning to the variables indicating ownership change in the lower part of Table 5, 
the interaction terms with the individual level characteristics now indicate 
differences in the consequences of M&A transactions for different types of 
employees. The results indicate that the increase in the job separation hazard 
following a domestic merger that was found above is driven by older employees. 
Comparing employees of similar age, there is actually a slight decrease in the job 
separation hazard following a domestic merger. However, the job separation 
hazard after a domestic merger increases with age, with the hazard ratio indicating 
a 0.4% increase per additional year of age. Following a foreign acquisition, there 
do not appear to be differences in job separation hazards between employees of 
different age. 
 
Education also appears to make a difference for job separation probabilities 
following a domestic merger. Having a university education increases the job 
separation hazard by 15% compared to colleagues of similar age following a 
domestic merger.  This would indicate restructuring at more skill intensive levels 
of the organization. By contrast, education does not appear to affect the job 
separation hazard following a foreign acquisition. There may, of course, be a 
longer term effect as found in Huttunen (2007).  
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4.2 Exits to different labour market states following foreign 
acquisitions 
 
Next, we estimate a multinomial logit model to analyze the effect that a foreign 
acquisition has on the probability of exiting a job to different labour market states 
compared to staying with the same employer. This estimation method is 
essentially a competing risks duration model for discrete time data with the 
somewhat restrictive assumption that spell length is intrinsically discrete rather 
than continuous but grouped into intervals12.  
 
The alternative destination states are those described above, i.e. unemployment, 
outside the labour force, employed outside the business sector, employed with a 
new business sector employer and employed with the same employer13. The 
destination-specific hazards are:  
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where x is a 1 x K vector, βj is K x 1, j=1, …, J.  To identify the model, we set the 
parameter vector related to the outcome “Same employer” to 0, i.e.  β1 = 0 . Thus 
the remaining coefficients will measure the change relative to the group who stay 
with the same employer. We will discuss the results in the form of the relative 
probability of a certain transition to the probability of staying at the same firm, i.e. 
odds ratios (or ratios of relative risk). These are defined as: 
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With this model, the ratio of relative risk for a one unit change in x(i) is 
 
                                                
12 See Jenkins (2005) for a discussion.  
13 Transitions into self-employment are excluded from the current analysis. Observations on these 
are very infrequent and do not affect the results.  
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 and subsequently the ratio of relative risk for one unit changes in two variables is 
obtained by multiplying the exponentiated coefficients for these variables.  
 
Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of the multinomial logit model 
comparing the probability of exiting to different destination states vs. staying with 
the same employer. The results are presented in the form of odds ratios as 
described above14. We include interactions with individual characteristics, i.e. in 
terms of covariates the specification corresponds to that in column 3 of Table 5.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The main variables of interest are those related to ownership change in the second 
part of Table 6. Similar to the estimations above, to control for persistent 
differences between firms that at some point are foreign owned or subject to an 
acquisition, we include an indicator for both of these groups. Employees in firms 
that are involved in an M&A transaction do not differ to a large extent in terms of 
their likelihood to leave their job rather than stay at their current job. They appear 
about 6 % less likely to change to a job outside the business sector than to stay 
with the same employer. However, being employed in a firm that at some point is 
foreign owned has quite a large impact on the relative risk of exiting a job to 
several different destination states, with an increase of 21% to 40% in the 
likelihood of changing jobs and an increase of 16% in the likelihood of becoming 
unemployed compared to staying with their current employer. Consistent with the 
results above, these findings imply that worker mobility from firms that become 
foreign owned is different from mobility from other firms in addition to the 
possible one off effect of the actual acquisition.  
 
                                                
14 The standard errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level. 
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Looking at the results on transitions to different states following M&A 
transactions we first compare employees of similar age and education and then 
turn to the effects of individual characteristics. The results show that in the service 
sector there is a decrease in the probability of changing jobs compared to staying 
at the same firm after both domestic and foreign acquisitions. There is also a 
decrease in the probability of moving into unemployment following a purely 
domestic merger. For employees in the industrial sector, there is again a slight 
decrease in the job separation hazard following domestic mergers when 
comparing employees of similar age as was found in column 3 of Table 5 and this 
appears to be due to a decreased likelihood of transitions to employment outside 
the business sector15. Following foreign acquisitions the increase in the job 
separation hazard found above consists of increased probabilities of exit to both 
other jobs, unemployment and out of the labour force. However, when using 
different reference outcomes16, we find that the likelihood of changing jobs either 
within the business sector or to an employer outside the business sector increases 
more than the likelihood of non-employment.  
 
Considering next the influence of individual characteristics on the impact that 
M&A transactions have, we see that increase in the job separation hazard of 
university educated employees following a domestic merger is related to an 
increased likelihood of changing to other jobs. The likelihood of becoming 
unemployed or moving out of the labour force compared to the likelihood os 
staying at the same firm does not change significantly. This would indicate that 
despite the increased job separation hazard, educated employees are not too 
adversely affected by the transaction.  Consistent with the findings above, 
education does not have much influence on labour market transitions following a 
foreign acquisition. The only change shows up in a decreased likelihood of 
becoming unemployed.   
 
                                                
15 As we are studying ratios of relative risk, the combined effect of two control variables is 
obtained by multiplying the two ratios. So the total impact for industrial sector employees is the 
odds ratio for ownership change in the service sector times the odds ratio for the industrial sector 
interaction.  
16 Results not shown, available on request.  
 19 
The increased job separation hazard following domestic mergers that was found 
above for older workers in the single risk model also shows up in this estimation. 
The increase is driven by higher probabilities of changing jobs and becoming 
unemployed. Transitions out of the labour force do not change significantly 
indicating that the increased job separation hazard is not to a great extent related 
to the oldest employees moving into early retirement. In line with the results 
above, age does not have a significant impact on transitions following foreign 
acquisitions, with only marginally significant changes in exit probabilities.  
 
The effects of the other covariates can also be interpreted in more detail when 
considering various destination states. The results in the first part of Table 6 show 
that e.g. older employees are slightly less likely to change jobs than to stay at the 
same firm. They are, however, more likely to become unemployed than to remain 
with the same employer. Also, compared to their male colleagues, women are 
more likely to become unemployed and change to a firm outside the business 
sector, but less likely to change to other business sector jobs. Women on average 
are also less likely to move out of the labour force, but this effect changes 
drastically when interacted with an indicator for having children under the age of 
7. These women are unsurprisingly much more likely to move out of the labour 
force than to stay at the same firm compared to their colleagues.  More educated 
employees are more likely to change jobs and less likely to become unemployed 
or move out of the labour force than stay at their existing job. Employees with 
higher tenure are less likely to exit a firm to any destination state, implying 
positive duration dependence. Higher earnings also reduce the likelihood of 
exiting a firm. Again, since earnings are likely to be endogenous, the model was 
also estimated without this variable. The effects of interest were robust to this 
change. Compared to employees in small firms, employees of larger firms are less 
likely to change jobs, which provides support to the hypothesis that the lower 
separation hazard in larger firms that was found in the single risk model reflects a 
broader range of job opportunities within large firms. As found above, declining 
employment implies that also in the following year employees are more likely to 
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exit than stay in the same firm and this effect extends to all the different 
destinations considered.  
4.3 Robustness checks 
 
In this section we consider some alternative specifications and extensions to the 
analysis. First, we analyze the effects of a different sectoral division on the results. 
Since our main results differ depending on whether a firm is in the service or 
industrial sector, we attempt to deepen the analysis by splitting the firms into 
narrower sectors and then interacting these with the variables indicating 
ownership change. As argued above, it could be that certain service sector firms 
need to maintain a customer interface, which could influence the ability of the 
firm to restructure its workforce in the short run. In addition, in the industrial 
sector, there may be differences in the motives of acquisitions in different sectors, 
as e.g. Ali-Yrkkö et al. (2004) report survey evidence indicating that technological 
know-how is an important reason for foreign acquisitions in some sectors. We use 
alternative sectoral divisions attempting to capture differences in the need for a 
customer interface in services on the one hand and importance of technological 
know-how in the industrial sector on the other (see Table 4).  
 
The results show17 that the impact of M&A transactions is similar in different 
service sectors, which may indicate that if the results reported above are driven by 
time needed to cope with the need for a customer interface, then this is true on a 
broad scale in the service sector. It should be noted, that our information on 
sectors is not very detailed (see Table 4) which may also influence the results. By 
contrast, when studying differences in the impact that foreign acquisitions have in 
different sectors in industry, we find that in sectors Manufacturing of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c and Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, the 
increase in the job separation hazard found in the rest of industry is absent18. No 
such difference between industrial sectors is found following domestic mergers. 
                                                
17 Results not shown, available on request. 
18 In this specification, the industrial sectors are split in two: Manufacturing of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c and Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment form one group and the 
rest of the industrial sectors form the other. A further division becomes problematic due to limited 
numbers of observations. 
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This finding indicates that the motives for foreign acquisitions in these sectors 
may differ from motives in other sectors, e.g. by having to do with access to 
technological know-how. This in turn is likely to influence the impact that foreign 
acquisitions have on employment outcomes in these sectors.  
 
Next, we consider the possibility that foreign acquisitions may have a different 
impact in cases where the acquired firm is already a multinational. This is related 
to the discussion that it is primarily differences between multinational and purely 
domestic firms rather than foreign and domestic firms that are relevant. In the 
context of foreign and domestic acquisitions this may not be as important, as 
many potential differences in the impacts of these transactions may be argued to 
mostly be related to whether the acquisition takes place in the local or foreign 
market. In any case, we run a similar estimation as that presented in column 3 of 
Table 5 but including interactions of the indicator for a foreign acquisition with an 
indicator for whether the firm is a multinational. We only have information on 
multinational status for the last years of our observation period, so this analysis 
includes data from 1999 onwards. The results show19 that in industrial sector 
firms that are already multinational, the job separation hazard of employees 
increases by slightly less than in purely domestic firms. This may obviously also 
be related to the prevalence of multinationals in the technologically intensive 
sectors discussed above. We also consider the possibility that the influence that an 
acquisition has on job separations may be related to the size of the acquired firm. 
This is related to multinational status in that multinationals are typically larger. 
The results show that in the largest firms the job separation hazard actually 
increases more than in smaller firms following a foreign acquisition. There is no 
difference following a domestic merger.  
 
Finally, we also conduct a robustness check using a linear probability model to 
describe job separations as opposed to the duration model we have discussed 
above. We run an OLS specification with covariates similar to those in the 
specification presented in column 3 of Table 5. We include plant fixed effects 
                                                
19 Results not shown, available on request. 
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which may to some extent also alleviate the problem of the endogeneity of 
acquisitions. The results from this specification are qualitatively similar to the 
results obtained using the duration model20, and thereby support our earlier 
findings.  
5 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the individual level employment effects 
of foreign acquisitions. The analysis shows that firms that become foreign owned 
are persistently different from firms that are continuously in domestic ownership, 
and employees in the firms that are, were previously, or will later be foreign 
owned are more likely to separate from their job. In the industrial sector, the job 
separation hazard increases in the year following a foreign or domestic 
acquisition. In the case of foreign acquisitions exits to both other jobs and non-
employment become more likely with the probability of changing jobs increasing 
more than the probability of moving to non-employment. However, in certain 
industrial sectors, where technological know-how may be argued to be important, 
the job separation hazard does not increase following foreign acquisitions. There 
is no such difference between different types of industrial sectors following 
domestic mergers. M&A transactions do not appear to influence the job separation 
hazard of service sector employees in the first year following the acquisition, but 
in the second and third years after the transaction the job separation hazard 
increases with a larger change following foreign than domestic acquisitions. In the 
industrial sector the job separation hazard decreases in the second and third years 
following both foreign and domestic acquisitions, implying a one-off 
restructuring.  
 
The impact of a foreign acquisition does not vary by individual characteristics in 
either sector, whereas following a domestic merger there is an increase in the job 
separation hazard of university educated employees. Also older workers 
experience an increase in their job separation hazard following a domestic merger. 
                                                
20 Results not shown, available on request. 
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All in all, the largest differences between changes in job separation hazards after 
M&A transactions appear to be related to sectoral differences. The changes 
observed following domestic and foreign acquisitions indicate similar types of 
restructuring, but the magnitudes of the changes are somewhat larger in the case 
of foreign acquisitions. The finding that the job separation hazard does not 
increase following foreign acquisitions in certain industrial sectors that may be 
considered knowledge intensive may well be indicative of different motives for 
these transactions compared to purely domestic mergers. In addition, the fact that 
the development of job separation hazards varies based on individual 
characteristics following domestic mergers but no such difference is found 
following foreign acquisitions, may be indicative of slightly different motives 
behind the transactions. Contrary to commonly expressed views in the public 
debate, the consequences of foreign acquisitions do not appear strictly more 
adverse than the consequences of purely domestic acquisitions.  
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Table 1 Firms involved in M&A 
Firms % Employees %
Firm NOT involved in M&A deal during 
observation period 83 552 98.8 % 1 199 767 92.5 %
Firm involved in domestic merger in 
previous year 572 0.7 % 58 981 4.5 %
Firm subject to foreign acquisition in 
previous year 386 0.5 % 31 926 2.5 %
Firm subject to foreign divestiture in 
previous year 93 0.1 % 6 931 0.5 %
Total 84 603 100.0 % 1 297 605 100.0 %  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev
Age 39.836 11.128
Female 0.366 0.482
Married 0.363 0.481
Children under age 7 0.197 0.397
Female* Children under age 7 0.064 0.244
Schooling years 11.364 2.141
Tenure (months) 98.248 108.223
Log of taxable income 9.996 0.642
Declining employment 0.367 0.482
Log of firm labour productivity 10.631 0.631
Exporting firm 0.501 0.500
Importing firm 0.572 0.495
Employer involved in domestic merger in previous year 0.032 0.175
Employer subject to foreign acquisition in previous year 0.017 0.129
Employer subject to foreign divestiture in previous year 0.004 0.061
Employer foreign owned at some point 0.188 0.391
Employer involved in M&A deal at some point 0.359 0.480
Employer in industrial sector 0.495 0.500
* employer subject to domestic merger in previous year 0.032 0.175
* employer subject to foreign acquisition in previous year 0.017 0.129
* employer subject to foreign divestiture in previous year 0.004 0.061
# of observations 1871277  
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics: firm size  
Size of firm Firms % Employees %
Under 5 employees 52,903 57.6 240,498 12.9
5-9 employees 14,301 15.57 143,628 7.7
10-19 employees 8,938 9.73 156,274 8.4
20-49 employees 6,339 6.9 202,312 10.8
50-99 employees 2,622 2.85 141,898 7.6
100-299 employees 2,632 2.87 232,570 12.4
Over 300 employees 4,105 4.47 754,097 40.3
Total 91,840 100 1,871,277 100  
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Table 4 Firms involved in M&A by sector 
Industry Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Mining and Quarrying 3 901 0.33 206 0.35 72 0.23 7 0.10 4 186 0.3 %
Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco
26 240 2.19 7 829 13.27 3 215 10.07 745 10.75 38 029 2.9 %
Manufacture of textiles 8 351 0.70 316 0.54 299 0.94 52 0.75 9 018 0.7 %
Manufacture of wearing apparel, leather and leather 
products
13 795 1.15 157 0.27 273 0.86 0 0.00 14 225 1.1 %
Manufacture of wood, wood products, pulp, paper 
and paper products
37 441 3.12 12 152 20.60 816 2.56 126 1.82 50 535 3.9 %
Publishing, printing 38 390 3.20 1 850 3.14 1 031 3.23 24 0.35 41 295 3.2 %
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, 
nuclear fuel, chemicals, chemical products and man-
made fibres
12 015 1.00 2 475 4.20 696 2.18 112 1.62 15 298 1.2 %
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 14 928 1.24 606 1.03 816 2.56 742 10.71 17 092 1.3 %
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
10 024 0.84 2 122 3.60 639 2.00 374 5.40 13 159 1.0 %
Manufacture of basic metals 12 925 1.08 167 0.28 625 1.96 0 0.00 13 717 1.1 %
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 44 043 3.67 1 526 2.59 741 2.32 294 4.24 46 604 3.6 %
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c, 
electrical and optical equipment
101 363 8.45 5 363 9.10 5 424 16.98 1 365 19.69 113 515 8.7 %
Manufacture of transport equipment 22 864 1.91 409 0.69 1 260 3.95 161 2.32 24 694 1.9 %
Manufacturing n.e.c. 20 487 1.71 599 1.02 292 0.91 101 1.46 21 479 1.7 %
Electricity, gas and water supply, Construction 148 068 12.34 3 773 6.40 1 411 4.42 183 2.64 153 435 11.8 %
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods, Hotels and restaurants
307 373 25.62 13 280 22.52 6 106 19.12 1 869 26.96 328 628 25.3 %
Transport, storage and communication 189 146 15.77 3 054 5.18 1 450 4.54 92 1.33 193 742 14.9 %
Financial intermediation 11 143 0.93 34 0.06 2 579 8.08 30 0.43 13 786 1.1 %
Real estate, renting and business activities 177 270 14.77 3 063 5.20 4 181 13.10 654 9.44 185 168 14.3 %
Total 1 199 767 100 58 981 100 31 926 100 6 931 100 1 297 605 100 %
Total
Employer NOT involved 
in M&A deal during 
observation period
Employer involved in 
domestic merger in 
previous year
Employer subject to 
foreign divestiture in 
previous year
Employer subject to 
foreign acquisition in 
previous year
 29 
Table 5 Estimation results: single risk duration model  
Hazard ratio estimates (1) (2) (3)
Age 0.996*** 0.999*** 0.996***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.939*** 0.920*** 0.939***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Married 1.081*** 1.068*** 1.081***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Children under age 7 0.920*** 0.968*** 0.920***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Female* Children under age 7 1.141*** 1.276*** 1.141***
(0.011) (0.023) (0.011)
Schooling years 1.021*** 1.018*** 1.020***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Tenure 0.987*** 0.989*** 0.987***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure squared 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of taxable income 0.646*** 0.604*** 0.646***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Declining employment 1.053*** 1.078*** 1.053***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
Log of firm labour productivity 0.932*** 0.886*** 0.931***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Exporting firm 1.008 0.928*** 1.008
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009)
Importing firm 0.946*** 0.894*** 0.946***
(0.007) (0.014) (0.007)
Firm size 5-9 employees 1.027*** 1.038** 1.027***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009)
Firm size 10-19 employees 0.999 1.018 0.999
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010)
Firm size 20-49 employees 0.980* 0.981 0.980*
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Firm size 50-99 employees 0.934*** 0.928*** 0.934***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.012)
Firm size 100-299 employees 0.860*** 0.834*** 0.861***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.012)
Firm size over 300 employees 0.811*** 0.755*** 0.812***
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
1.061*** 1.127*** 1.061***
(0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
1.02 1.01 1.021
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Table continues on next page
Employer foreign owned at some point
Employer involved in M&A deal at some point
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Table 5 continued 
Hazard ratio estimates
Employer involved in domestic M&A deal
0.945*** 1.056 0.815***
(0.019) (0.040) (0.034)
1.096**
(0.050)
1.100*
(0.055)
Employer involved in foreign acquisition
0.971 0.924* 0.895**
(0.023) (0.044) (0.047)
1.259***
(0.060)
1.317***
(0.068)
Employer involved in foreign divestiture
0.902* 0.759*** 0.992
(0.047) (0.069) (0.120)
0.894
(0.091)
1.08
(0.103)
Employer in industrial sector 
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal
1.182*** 1.225*** 1.161***
(0.033) (0.065) (0.032)
0.887*
(0.055)
0.766***
(0.049)
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 
1.245*** 1.223*** 1.240***
(0.041) (0.078) (0.041)
0.745***
(0.051)
0.688***
(0.050)
* employer involved in foreign divestiture
1.044 1.124 1.044
(0.076) (0.148) (0.076)
1.404**
(0.206)
0.865
(0.133)
University education
1.153***
(0.045)
1.045
(0.047)
1.049
(0.105)
Age
1.004***
(0.001)
1.002
(0.001)
0.997
(0.003)
Observations 1871277 725386 1871277
Sectors All All All
Unobserved heterogeneity Gaussian Gaussian Gaussian
* employer involved in foreign divestiture 1 
year ago
Notes
1. Reference category for firm size is under 5 employees
2. Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 1 
year ago
* employer involved in foreign divestiture 1 
year ago
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal 1 
year ago
* employer involved in foreign acquisition 1 
year ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
* employer involved in domestic M&A deal 1 
year ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
3. Coefficients for industry, region and year dummies  as well as 2nd and 3rd lags of labour productivity, export 
and import status in model (2) not reported
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
1 year ago
2 years ago
3 years ago
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Table 6 Estimation results: multinomial logit model  
Odds ratio estimates with                   
reference category                      
"Same employer"
Unemployment Out of the labour 
force
New employer 
outside business 
sector
New business 
sector employer
Age 1.0321*** 0.9982** 0.9906*** 0.9674***
(63.31) (-2.65) (-16.65) (-68.94)
Female 1.0351*** 0.8613*** 1.1029*** 0.8664***
(3.37) (-14.02) (9.29) (-16.16)
Married 1.3567*** 1.4070*** 0.9315*** 0.9179***
(28.43) (32.39) (-6.33) (-9.14)
Children under age 7 0.8600*** 0.4507*** 0.9777 1.0390***
(-10.30) (-38.74) (-1.56) (3.61)
Female* Children under age 7 1.0459 5.3053*** 0.8308*** 0.6497***
(1.95) (68.85) (-8.55) (-23.54)
Schooling years 0.9102*** 0.9731*** 1.0950*** 1.0497***
(-37.43) (-10.83) (40.45) (26.58)
Tenure 0.9841*** 0.9838*** 0.9914*** 0.9836***
(-121.13) (-104.02) (-57.12) (-109.06)
Tenure squared 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 1.0000***
(107.05) (109.51) (45.47) (69.57)
Log of taxable income 0.5725*** 0.3273*** 0.6258*** 0.7531***
(-78.44) (-154.03) (-57.09) (-42.25)
Declining employment 1.1054*** 1.1039*** 1.1148*** 1.1382***
(12.45) (11.27) (12.37) (18.31)
Log of firm labour productivity 0.7744*** 0.9431*** 0.8782*** 0.8175***
(-38.05) (-7.60) (-17.83) (-36.81)
Exporting firm 1.0520*** 1.0472*** 0.9245*** 0.9264***
(3.75) (3.31) (-5.50) (-6.64)
Importing firm 0.8957*** 0.9898 0.9031*** 0.8700***
(-8.42) (-0.77) (-7.38) (-12.80)
Firm size 5-9 employees 1.1883*** 1.0995*** 0.8886*** 1.0908***
(10.93) (5.47) (-6.63) (6.78)
Firm size 10-19 employees 1.0932*** 1.1040*** 0.8826*** 1.0723***
(5.49) (5.69) (-7.02) (5.40)
Firm size 20-49 employees 1.1241*** 1.1398*** 0.9331*** 1.0284*
(7.41) (7.83) (-4.12) (2.21)
Firm size 50-99 employees 1.0885*** 1.1617*** 0.9580* 1.0328*
(4.51) (7.61) (-2.18) (2.14)
Firm size 100-299 employees 1.0085 1.0535** 0.8844*** 0.8605***
(0.46) (2.73) (-6.59) (-10.03)
Firm size over 300 employees 0.8687*** 1.0816*** 0.8874*** 0.6641***
(-7.98) (4.45) (-6.82) (-28.39)
Table continues on next page  
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Table 6 continued  
Odds ratio estimates with                   
reference category                      "Same 
employer"
Unemployment Out of the labour 
force
New employer 
outside business 
sector
New business 
sector employer
1.1601*** 1.0261 1.3960*** 1.2066***
(9.88) (1.67) (21.44) (14.51)
1.0145 1.0075 0.9583** 1.0246*
(1.10) (0.57) (-3.01) (2.11)
0.8339* 0.9428 0.7080*** 0.8944
(-1.99) (-0.62) (-3.56) (-1.42)
0.8782 1.2528 0.8792 0.7007***
(-1.12) (1.72) (-1.17) (-3.72)
0.4824* 1.2497 1.1915 0.7792
(-2.40) (0.77) (0.62) (-1.12)
Employer in industrial sector 
1.0770 0.9729 1.3409*** 0.9869
(1.37) (-0.49) (5.43) (-0.28)
1.3196*** 1.1998** 1.4186*** 1.6308***
(4.18) (2.59) (5.53) (9.06)
0.8205 0.9992 1.6959*** 0.9463
(-1.29) (-0.01) (3.48) (-0.45)
University education
1.0083 1.0924 1.1747* 1.3736***
(0.08) (0.86) (2.21) (5.02)
0.6769** 1.2220 0.9127 1.0727
(-2.73) (1.69) (-1.09) (0.98)
0.9373 1.1928 0.9540 1.2283
(-0.21) (0.67) (-0.23) (1.32)
Age
1.0047* 1.0025 1.0066** 1.0055*
(2.23) (0.94) (2.77) (2.55)
1.0048 0.9921* 1.0021 1.0061*
(1.81) (-2.20) (0.79) (2.40)
1.0179** 0.9919 0.9805** 1.0015
(2.62) (-0.99) (-2.69) (0.24)
Observations 1871277
Pseudo R-Square 0.1232
Employer foreign owned at some point
Employer involved in M&A deal at 
some point
Employer involved in domestic M&A 
deal in previous year
Employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
Employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
* employer involved in domestic 
M&A deal in previous year
2. Reference category for firm size is under 5 employees
3. Cluster robust (by individual) t-statistics in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%, *** significant at 0.1%.
4. Coefficients for industry, region and year dummies not reported
* employer involved in foreign 
acquisition in previous year
* employer involved in foreign 
divestiture in previous year
Notes
1. The reference category is "Same employer"
 
 
 
 
 
